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This paper examines the effect of the BI rate announcements on financial markets in 
Indonesia. The estimation results show that interbank interest rates with overnight, 1-
week, and 1-month maturity are significantly lower a day before the announcement of 
lower BI-rate. On the other hand, the levels of exchange rate return, stock return, or 
government bond’s yield are not significantly affected by BI-rate announcements. The 
announcements of lower or constant BI-rate significantly bring down volatility of 
interbank interest rate with overnight, 1-week, and 1-month maturity, as well as the 
volatility of government bonds’ yield, exchange rate return and stock returns.  The largest 
effect of BI rate announcement is experienced by overnight interbank interest rate, both 
in terms of level as well as in terms of volatility.  
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1. Introduction 
In line with the growing implementation of inflation targeting framework since the 
1990s, many central banks have moved toward more transparent policies. The need for a 
more transparent central bank has been accepted not only in academic but also in central 
banks. There is a broad consensus that transparency may help the effectiveness of policy 
(Woodford, 2003). Two key arguments stand out for the emphasis of the need for more 
transparent central bank. On normative side, as a public institution, independent central 
banks should meet high standard accountability through transparency. And from the 
conduct of monetary policy, it is viewed that the efficiency of monetary policy depends 
heavily on the credibility of central banks to implement inflation targeting framework and 
public perceptions of the consistency of central bank actions to achieve its announced 
targets (Heenan et al., 2006)   The increase in the transparency itself is reflected in the 
increase in public communication by central banks. 
Within inflation targeting frameworks, monetary policy communication is a key 
component, and inflation targeting central banks typically put much more effort into 
explaining the policy issues and decision, as well as more open about central bank 
activities. As pointed out by Heenan et al (2006), the main objectives of monetary policy 
communication is to convince economic agents—notably including  financial market 
participants, price and wage setters, and fiscal authorities—that policy formulation and 
implementation is consistently oriented toward achieving inflation objective. Particularly 
for financial markets, the objectives of monetary policy announcement include ensuring 
that market participants are fully and simultaneously informed of any adjustments in 
policy instruments, ensuring that reporting and debate on monetary policy issues is well-
informed, and promoting good understanding of monetary policy’s approach to policy 
formulation and risk assessment to maximize policy predictability.  
While there is a convergence towards an agreement on the importance of central 
bank communication for the effectiveness of monetary policy, the effectiveness of 
communication strategy undertaken by a typical central bank remains an issue.  In 
general, the effectiveness of central bank communication can be defined into two 
elements (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007), that is, the ability of financial markets to 
predict future monetary policy decisions (market predictability), and the ability of policy 
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makers to influence financial markets by moving asset prices in desired direction (market 
responsiveness). The hypothesis here is that if central bank is transparent then market 
should be able to anticipate policy decision rules well, that is, changes in asset prices on 
the announcement days should be small.  
Recognizing the importance of transparency of an independent central bank, Bank 
Indonesia has moved toward a more transparent central bank since it obtained its 
independence from the government in 1999. The need for a more transparent central bank 
become even more crucial for Bank Indonesia since its implementation of inflation 
targeting framework started on July 2005. Since 1999 Bank Indonesia has taken various 
measures to be more open to the public regarding policies issues and decision as well as 
operations and research. In this respects, Bank Indonesia communicates with the public 
through various publications, Board’s speeches and testimonies, seminars, and 
discussions.   
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of Bank Indonesia’s policy 
announcements on financial markets in Indonesia. Specifically, we investigate how Bank 
Indonesia’s monetary policy announcements affect inter-bank interest rates, exchange 
rate of the rupiah, stock return, and government bond’s yield in Indonesia. A better 
understanding on the effects of monetary policy announcement on financial markets will 
give a better understanding on the effectiveness of monetary policy undertaken.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews monetary policy 
communication in Indonesia. Section 3 presents literature review. Section 4 discusses 
theoretical background of the announcement effects of monetary policy. Section 5 
presents empirical models. Section 6 presents data and their descriptive statistics. Section 
7 shows estimation results. Finally, this paper concludes with section 8.  
  
2. Monetary Policy Communication in Indonesia 
 The milestone of the implementation of inflation targeting framework in 
Indonesia is the change in the operational target from base money into interest rate in 
July 2005 in which the reference rate used in monetary policy is called BI rate. To 
increase the effectiveness of the monetary policy in influencing public expectation on 
inflation, Bank Indonesia enhances its transparency and accountability in the 
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implementation of monetary policy. And in line with the increase in transparency and 
accountability, since July 2005 Bank Indonesia announces BI Rate following Board of 
Governor policy meeting every month.  
As stipulated in Act No. 23, 1999 amended by Act No.3, 2004, Bank Indonesia’s 
board of governor is required to hold monetary policy meeting at least once in a month. 
The policy meeting evaluates monetary policy undertaken and sets the direction of the 
monetary policy. The policy meeting is scheduled on first Tuesday or Thursday for every 
month following the day in which inflation rate is released by BPS (Statistics Indonesia). 
The BPS releases inflation rate on the first working day of every month. If for some 
reason the meeting cannot be held either on Tuesday or Thursday, the policy meeting is 
held on different pre-announced day. All policy meeting days are pre-announced 
publicly.  
 Table 1 shows the policy meeting days and BI decisions on BI rates. Since Bank 
Indonesia started using BI rate as a policy instrument until September 2007, there were 
26 announcement days of BI rate, in which BI rate was raised five times,   BI rate was cut 
13 times and BI rate was kept unchanged eight times. Out of those 26 BI rate 
announcements, there is only incidence in which market expectation on BI rate was 
different from the announced BI rate, that is, on April 2007. Prior to the announcement 
on April 5, 2007, the median of market expectation on BI rate was 8.75 while the BI rate 
announced on April 5 was 9.00%2.  
To avoid favoring some players in financial markets, the announcement of the 
policy meeting is released simultaneously, and since prompt information on BI rate is of 
great interest not only to domestic agents but also to foreigners, the press release on 
policy rate is published in both Bahasa Indonesia and English. As pointed out by Heenan 
et al (2002), international audiences of the policy announcement are also very important. 
International investors, portfolio managers, and foreign exchange strategists may not be 
well informed on the inflation targeting regime being into place that financial market may 
be more volatile than if such audiences were better informed. As background to its 
2 The market expectation on BI rate is the expectation of a sample of large financial institutions provided by 
Bloomberg.  
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monthly policy statement, Bank Indonesia publishes a Monetary Policy Review in the 
months when a full inflation report has not been released by BPS.  
 
    Table 1: Bank Indonesia’s Press Release on BI Rate 
Date Day Board of Governor Meeting’s (RDG) decision 
July 5, 2005 Tuesday Sets BI rate for the first time, that is, at  8.5% 
August 9, 2005 Tuesday Raises BI rate by 25 bps to 8.75% 
September 6, 2005 Tuesday Raises BI rate by 125 bps to 10.00% 
October 4, 2005 Tuesday Raises BI rate by 100 bps to 11.00% 
November 1, 2005 Tuesday Raises BI rate by 125 bps to 12.25% 
December 6, 2005 Tuesday Raises BI rate by 50 bps to 12.75% 
January 9, 2006 Monday Keeps BI rate at 12.75% 
February 7, 2006 Tuesday Keeps BI rate at 12.75% 
March 7, 2006 Tuesday Keeps BI rate at 12.75% 
April 5, 2006 Wednesday Keeps BI rate at 12.75% 
May 9, 2006 Tuesday Cuts BI rate by 25 bps to 12.50% 
June 6, 2006 Tuesday Keeps BI rate at 12.50% 
July 6, 2006 Thursday Cuts BI rate by 25 bps to 12.25% 
August 8, 2006 Tuesday Cuts BI rate by 50 bps to 11.75% 
September 5, 2006 Tuesday Cuts BI rate by 50 bps to 11.25% 
October 5, 2006 Thursday Cuts BI rate by 50 bps to 10.75% 
November 7, 2006 Tuesday Cuts BI rate by 50 bps to 10.25% 
December 7, 2006 Thursday Cuts BI rate by 50 bps to 9.75% 
January 4, 2007 Thursday Curs BI rate by 25 bps to 9.50% 
February 6, 2007 Tuesday Cuts BI rate by 25 bps to 9.25% 
March 6, 2007 Tuesday Cuts BI rate by 25 bps to 9.00% 
April 5, 2007 Thursday Keeps BI rate at 9.00% 
May 8, 2007 Tuesday Cuts BI rate by 25 bps to 8.75% 
June 7, 2007 Thursday Cuts BI rate by 25 bps to 8.50% 
July 5, 2007 Thursday Cuts BI rate by 25 bps to 8.25% 
August 7, 2007 Tuesday Keeps BI rate at 8.25% 
September 6, 2007 Thursday Keeps BI rate at 8.25% 
    Source: Bank Indonesia 
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3. Literature Review 
 A large number of studies on the effects of macroeconomic announcements on 
financial markets can be found in the literature. And so far, most of the empirical studies 
on the announcement effects of monetary policy focus on the US and ECB monetary 
policy. Jones et al. (1998) examines the effects of announcements on the volatility of 
asset prices. They find that the volatility of asset prices on the announcement day does 
not persist, which is consistent with the immediate incorporation of information into 
prices. Unlike non-announcement shocks, shocks to volatility that occur on 
announcement days have no subsequent impact on daily volatility. When markets know 
that a large shock is forthcoming, return volatility in the market decreases.  
 Gurkayank et al. (2005) argue that viewing the effects of FOMC announcements 
on financial markets as driven by changes in federal fund rate target itself is inadequate. 
Instead, a second policy factor, which is the statements that the FOMC releases, 
accounted for more than three-fourth of the explaninable variation in the movements of 
five- and ten-year Treasury yield. When the decisions regarding the target for federal 
funds rate is not a surprise, changes in the wording of FOMC statements typically have 
been the major driver of financial market response.    
Demirlap and Jorda (2004) investigate to what extent the policy of “the 
announcement” affected a key ingredient in the monetary transmission mechanism, that 
is, the term structure of nominally risk-free, Treasury securities. They show that the 
movements of short-term interest rates tend be driven by public announcements by the 
Fed rather than liquidity changes as a result of open market operation  
 Bomfim (2000) examines how stock market in the US is affected by the Federal 
Reserve’s scheduled policy announcements. He finds that stock market tends to be 
relatively quite on days preceding regularly scheduled policy announcements, that is, the 
conditional volatility of stock return is abnormally low on those days. The element of 
surprise in actual interest rate decisions tends to boost stock market volatility 
significantly in the short run, and positive surprises tend to have a larger effect on 
volatility than negative surprises.  
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) use daily data of interest rates in the US and euro 
area market to examine the effectiveness of monetary policy announcement in those two 
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markets. They find that interest rates in US and euro area markets respond strongly to 
domestic monetary policy announcements. And interest rates in Germany and the euro 
area market react to Federal Reserve announcements in addition to European monetary 
policy announcements, while interest rates in US markets in general do not respond to 
European monetary policy announcements. 
Rosa and Verga (2006) use tick-by-tick data to examine how ECB policy rate 
decision and the explanation of its monetary policy stance systematically hit financial 
markets the euro area. They find that unexpected component of ECB explanations 
significantly affect future prices and the impact is sizable. Their results suggest that 
financial markets seem to believe that the ECB does what it says it will do.  
Among a few studies on the announcement effects of monetary policy other than 
that of the US or the ECB has been done, for example, by Guthrie and Right (2000). In 
their paper they develop theoretical as well as empirical models to analyze the effect of 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) on interest rates in New Zealand. Their study 
show that the RBNZ has used communication systematically and effectively in 
controlling short-term interest rates. 
 Whereas a large literature exists on the response of monetary policy 
announcements on financial markets in industrialized countries, relatively little is known 
about the response of monetary policy announcement on financial markets in developing 
countries. This paper fills the gap in the literature by providing evidence on the effect of 
monetary policy announcements on financial markets in Indonesia.  
 
4. Theoretical Background 
Theoretically, the goal of the policy announcement is to increase transparency that 
leads to improving economic efficiency. The influential work by Cukierman and Meltzer 
(1986) has provided a theoretical explanation on the importance of monetary policy 
communication and transparency. Cukierman and Meltzer define credibility as how fast 
is public recognizes the changes in the objectives of policymaker. Looser monetary 
control and higher time preference of policymakers leads to variable monetary growth 
that in turn lower credibility. Policymakers may choose a more ambiguous procedure 
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monetary control if their objectives are less certain and have higher time preference, and 
therefore it takes longer for monetary policy to gain credible deflationary policy.   
 In another theoretical model, Guthrie and Wright (2000) analyze how central bank 
statements (open mouth operation) rather than open market operation leads to large 
changes in interest rates.  Their model shows how the central bank can achieve inflation 
(and output) outcome without having to use open market operations to influence interest 
rates. Instead, as they show in their model, the central bank can achieve its objective by 
having a credible threat which ties down the level of interest rates. Without knowing the 
central bank’s preferred rate, the private sector may deliver the wrong rate. This deviation 
is costly from the central bank perspective.  
By making an announcement (open mouth operation), the central bank can ensure 
the private sector delivers the correct rate. In choosing when to make such statements, the 
central bank trades off the flow costs of deviations away from its preferred level with the 
costs of making announcements. As central bank announcements release new 
information, each announcement should lead to a discrete jump in the level of interest 
rates in the desired direction. Moreover, using only publicly available information, 
announcements should be predictable—if the private sector could anticipate the released 
information, that information would already be incorporated in market rates.   
The empirical implications of Guthrie and Wright’s (2000) theoretical model are 
as follows. First, an open mouth operation that released regularly represents a surprise to 
the private sector. If the market already knows that the central bank wants a change in 
monetary conditions, the market will already have delivered it. And second, interest rates 
of all maturities increase significantly following a tightening announcement, together 
with some appreciation of exchange rate. In another study specifically on financial 
markets, Ehrmann and Fratszcher (2007) argue that a credible monetary authority may be 
able to influence asset prices by communicating its views about its intended level and by 
signaling its intention to move policy if asset prices deviate from the target  
 Regarding the effects of monetary policy announcement on stock market, Bomfim 
(2003) argues that there are two possibilities in which the announcements affect stock 
market. First, there is a potential for pre-announcement effects which is commonly 
dubbed as “calm-before-the-storm” effect. With this kind of effect, conditional volatility 
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of asset returns tend to be lower in days leading up to releases of major economic data 
(“calming” effect) and then higher on the day of the announcement itself (“storm” effect). 
And second, monetary policy decisions potentially affect market volatility through the 
nature of the decision itself. The announcement of the policy decision may reveal new 
information which is not previously incorporated into asset prices and volatility while 
participants process the newly received information.  
 
5. Empirical Model 
To measure the reactions of financial markets to Bank Indonesia’s policy 
announcement, we use Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) model. Similar model has also been used in many other studies on the effect of 
announcements on asset markets (see for example, Jones et al, 1998; Bomfim, 2003; and 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher’s, 2007). The advantage of using exponential GARCH is that it 
corrects for the kurtosis, and skewness of the data. Considering that communication may 
influence both level and volatility of asset prices, we model both the influence of 
communication on asset price levels as well as the influence of communication on the 
volatility of asset prices.  
Specifically, the base model is formulated as follows. Let tR  be the asset price 
returns then the relationship between asset price returns and announcement is given by:  
 
tttttt THUTUEDDDRR    6513211110                 (1) 
ttt h 
THUTUEDDDhh tttttt 651321112
2
110     
 
where t is an independently identical distributed random variable with zero mean and 
unit variance, D is a dummy for day in which BI policy rate is announced, TUE is dummy 
for Tuesday, and  THU is dummy for Thursday. 
 Other than base model above, we also estimate the following model in which the 
announcement days are broken down based on the changes in the BI rate, that is:  
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where D is a dummy in which BI announces lower BI rate, 0D  is a dummy in which BI 
announces keeps BI rate, and D  is a dummy in which BI announces higher BI rate. The 
estimation uses Bollersev-Wooldridge robust quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) 
covariance/standard errors.   
 
6. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
Data on Bank Indonesia’s announcement on policy rates are obtained from Bank 
Indonesia’s website which is released every month following the policy meetings. Data 
on daily interest rates, exchange rates, and Jakarta Stock Market (JSX) Composite Index , 
and government-bond yield are obtained from CEIC database. Sample runs from July 1, 
2005 to September 28, 2007. The starting date is chosen based on the fact that the use of 
BI rate as policy instrument started in July 2005. The advantage of using daily data is that 
it accounts for potential overshooting effects in the very short run (Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher, 2007). Moreover, since market participants are not necessarily clear about the 
exact time of the day in which monetary authority change the policy rate, using daily data 
instead of tick-by-tick data for the purpose of this study is reasonable.  
Financial data are 5-days-week data, and missing data for holidays are replaced by 
data of the last active day before the holiday. The interest rates we examine in this study 
are inter-bank interest rates with overnight, 1-week, and 1-month maturity while 
government-bond yield is 1-year maturity. For exchange rate, we calculate daily 
exchange rate return of the rupiah per US dollar. Therefore, exchange rate depreciation 
results in positive return while exchange rate appreciation results in negative return, and 
the higher the depreciation, the higher is the exchange rate return. Finally, Stock return is 
calculated as a daily percentage of change in JSX composite index.   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
 R_1N R_1W R_1M R_ER R_JSX SUN_1Y 
       
 Mean 7.76 8.92 10.82 -0.01 0.12 10.58 
 Median 7.48 8.93 10.89 0.00 0.13 10.64 
 Maximum 21.11 15.35 17.01 3.73 6.73 17.00 
 Minimum 3.50 3.59 3.69 -5.32 -6.65 2.31 
 Std. Dev. 3.02 2.53 2.11 0.56 1.33 2.06 
 Skewness 1.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.72 -0.72 0.07 
 Kurtosis 4.43 1.69 1.83 22.58 8.32 2.28 
       
 Jarque-Bera 164.2 42.0 33.8 9391.0 739.6 12.99 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       
 Sum 4545.0 5226.4 6341.3 -6.6 72.8 6199.5 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 5322.3 3749.2 2608.3 179.9 1040.6 2482.5 
       
 Observations 586 586 586 585 585 586 
 
 
Summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 2. The statistics of the interest 
rates show that while overnight rate has the lowest mean relative to 1-week and 1-month 
rates, the overnight rate has the highest standard deviation. This indicates that the 
overnight rate is more volatile relative to 1-week and 1-month rates. The information on 
the skewness and kurtosis of the data motivate the use of ARCH class of model in this 
paper. And the Jarque-Bera statistics show that for all series, the null hypothesis of a 
normal distribution is rejected at one percent significance level.  
Compared with the average of non-announcement days, except for overnight 
interbank interest rate, the average of interbank interest rates are higher than those of the 
average of non-announcement days (Table 3). A closer look at the announcement days 
shows that the averages of interbank interest rates in the announcement day, regardless 
the direction of the announced BI rate, are higher than the average of interbank interest 
rates in non-announcement days. However, when the announced BI rate does not change 
or increase, the averages of interbank interest rate are higher. If we look at the standard 
deviation of the data, overnight rate and 1-week rate have lower standard deviation on 
announcement days, while 1-month rate has the higher standard deviation on the 
announcement days (Table 4).   
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Table 3: Mean of the Data by Announcements 
 R_1N R_1W R_1M R_ER R_JSX SUN_1Y 
All Days 7.76 8.92 10.82 -0.011 0.124 10.58 
Non-Announcement (t) 7.75 8.91 10.81 -0.014 0.121 10.58 
       
Announcement (t-1) 7.25 8.90 10.97 -0.027 0.239 10.53 
Announcement (t) 7.88 9.16 11.04 0.050 0.190 10.59 
Announcement (t+1) 7.51 9.32 10.97 -0.090 0.050 10.56 
       
Announcement cut (t-1) 6.39 7.67 10.22 0.019 0.182 9.52 
Announcement cut (t) 7.46 8.27 10.37 0.139 0.254 9.69 
Announcement cut (t+1) 7.11 8.50 10.37 -0.057 0.235 9.70 
       
Announcement keep (t-1) 7.96 9.42 10.98 0.122 -0.063 10.57 
Announcement keep (t) 7.75 9.36 10.98 -0.098 -0.210 10.55 
Announcement keep (t+1) 7.97 9.58 11.00 -0.106 -0.130 10.56 
       
Announcement raise (t-1) 8.21 11.14 12.89 0.098 0.736 13.05 
Announcement raise (t) 9.23 11.13 12.89 -0.415 0.931 12.99 
Announcement raise (t+1) 7.71 11.00 12.45 -0.148 -0.093 12.77 
  
Table 4: Standard Deviation of the Data by Announcements 
 R_1N R_1W R_1M R_ER R_JSX SUN_1Y 
All Days 3.02 2.53 2.11 0.555 1.335 2.06 
Non Announcement (t) 3.05 2.54 2.10 0.558 1.346 2.06 
       
Announcement (t-1) 2.31 2.62 2.30 0.052 1.268 2.19 
Announcement (t) 2.33 2.46 2.37 0.490 1.100 2.11 
Announcement (t+1) 2.50 2.65 2.13 0.570 1.270 2.08 
       
Announcement cut (t-1) 1.35 1.96 1.65 0.486 0.765 1.58 
Announcement cut (t) 2.00 1.87 1.65 0.358 0.881 1.45 
Announcement cut (t+1) 2.34 2.49 1.67 0.586 1.374 1.48 
       
Announcement keep (t-1) 2.60 2.62 2.50 0.455 1.864 2.23 
Announcement keep (t) 2.11 2.59 2.49 0.647 1.437 2.29 
Announcement keep (t+1) 3.01 2.75 2.49 0.387 1.413 2.34 
       
Announcement raise (t-1) 3.33 2.77 2.70 0.634 0.968 1.60 
Announcement raise (t) 3.39 2.79 3.20 0.499 0.782 1.53 
Announcement raise (t+1) 2.26 2.48 2.23 0.889 0.819 1.45 
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For exchange rate, the average of exchange rate return is higher when the 
announced BI rate is lower, and the average exchange rate return is lower when the 
announced BI rate is higher or doesn’t change. The average stock return is also higher 
when announced BI rate is lower or higher, but the average is lower when the announced 
BI rate doesn’t change.  And the average of government-bond yield is lower when 
announced BI rate is lower or doesn’t change, and higher when the announced BI rate is 
higher. Standard deviations of exchange rate return and stock return are lower when 
announced BI rate is lower or higher, but the standard deviation is higher then the 
announced BI rate doesn’t change. Meanwhile, standard deviation of government-bond 
yield is lower when BI rate is either higher or lower. 
Given that monetary policy meetings are normally held either on Tuesday or 
Thursday, and so do the announcements on the decisions on of policy meetings, the 
models include dummy for Tuesday and Thursday to capture days-of-the week effects. 
Except overnight inter-bank interest rates, other interbank interest rates on either Tuesday 
or Thursday do not seem to substantially differ from interbank interest rates on other days 
(Figure 1). The average of overnight interest rates on Tuesday is substantially higher than 
the average of overnight interest rates on the other days. However, if we look at the 
standard deviations of the data for each day, Tuesday does not have the largest standard 
deviation even for overnight interest rate. And although interest rate with 1 month 
maturity tends to have higher standard deviation on Friday, but the magnitude of the 
differences are very small. If we look at Figure 2, the highest average exchange rate 
return is on Tuesday which preceded and followed by negative return. On the other hand, 
stock return reached the highest average on Friday, instead of Tuesday or Thursday.  And 
the largest standard deviation of exchange rate return occurs on Wednesday, while the 
largest standard deviation of stock return occurs on Monday.  
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Figure 1: Mean and Standard Deviation of Interest Rates by Day of the Week 
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Figure 2: Mean and Standard Deviation of Exchange Rate Return, Stock Returns, 
          Government Bond’s Yield  by Day of the Week 
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7. Estimation Results 
The most commonly used model of financial asset return volatility is the GARCH 
(1,1). The advantage of GARCH specification over ARCH specification is parsimony in 
identifying the conditional variance in GARCH (Wang, 2003). Moreover, GARCH 
models provide approximate descriptions of conditional volatility for a wide variety of 
volatility process (Jones, 1998). As discussed in section 5, two model specifications are 
estimated: (i) the model without taking into account direction of the change in BI rate; 
and (ii) the models separating the effects of the announcement based on the direction of 
the change in BI rate. The estimation results for those two model specifications are as 
follows.   
 
7.1. Interest Rates 
As shown in Table 5, interbank interest rate with 1-week maturity is significantly 
lower on the announcement day. A day before the announcement, interbank interest rates 
are significantly lower for overnight, and 1-week maturity, at least at 10 percent 
significance level. On the other hand, none of the interest rates is significantly lower for a 
day after the announcement. The effects of Tuesday or Thursday on interest rates are 
mixed, that is, on Tuesday interest rate is significantly higher for overnight and 1-week 
maturity, and it is significantly lower for 1-month maturity. On Thursday, only interest 
rate for 1-month that is significantly lower. 
 In terms of volatility, none of the interest rate is significantly lower on the 
announcement day or the day before the announcement, while on the day following the 
announcement the volatility of overnight rate and 1-month rate is significantly lower. If 
we look at the days-of-the-week effect, while the volatility of 1-week rate and 1-month 
rate are significantly lower on Tuesday, none of the interest rate has significant lower 
volatility on Thursday.  
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Table 5: Estimation Results for Interest Rate (without Direction of BI-Rate Change) 
 R_1N R_1W R_1M  R_1N R_1W R_1M 
Mean  
Equation    
Variance 
Equation    
    C 2.993*** 0.751*** 0.340*** 
C 1.561*** 0.728*** 0.501**  (4.19) (4.64) (3.53) 
 (5.37) (3.00) (2.31) ARCH(1) 0.089 0.200 0.157 
R_1N(-1) 0.791*** 0.924*** 0.952***  (1.55) (1.01) (0.14) 
 (20.39) (33.75) (49.40) GARCH(1) 0.543*** 0.493*** 0.580** 
DUM(-1) -0.564* -0.677*** 0.147*  (6.63) (7.92) (2.00) 
 -(1.79) -(3.49) (1.83) DUM(-1) -1.337 -0.187 -0.015 
DUM 0.093 -0.327*** 0.001  -(1.00) -(0.82) -(0.11) 
 (0.49) -(4.36) (0.03) DUM -2.043* -0.196 -0.069 
DUM(1) -0.074 0.374 -0.093  -(1.75) -(0.46) -(0.30) 
 -(0.28) (1.59) -(1.06) DUM(1) -3.115*** -0.098 -0.214*** 
TUE 0.424** 0.152** -0.074***  -(4.40) -(0.14) -(2.70) 
 (2.28) (2.35) -(3.25) TUE -1.087 -0.984*** -0.349*** 
THU -0.029 -0.044 -0.121**  -(0.78) -(4.18) -(2.57) 
 -(0.11) -(0.34) -(2.40) THU -0.354 0.046 -0.075 
     -(0.17) (0.06) -(0.36) 
R-squared 0.630 0.853 0.906    
Adjusted R-squared 0.621 0.849 0.904    
S.E. of regression 1.860 0.985 0.653    
Sum squared resid 1968.3 551.9 242.7    
Log likelihood -1202.0 -763.2 -453.7    
Durbin-Watson stat 1.906 1.943 1.776    
Notes:  Numbers in the parentheses are z-statistics with Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard 
error. ***) significant at 1%; **) significant at 5%; *) significant at 10%. 
 
 
 In Table 6 we show the results of the estimation of the interest rate models in 
which the announcements are broken down based on the direction of the policy, that is, 
BI rate is cut, BI rate doesn’t change, and BI rate is raised. A day before the 
announcement of a lower BI rate the interbank interest rates for overnight, 1-week, and 1-
month maturity are significantly lower. On the announcement day, however, the 
announcement of unchanged BI-rate is only significantly for 1-week interbank rate, and 
the effect is negative.  
 Looking at the volatility of interest rates, on the announcement day the volatility 
of interest rate is significantly lower for 1-month maturity if BI rate is cut and for 1-week 
and 1-month maturity if BI rate doesn’t change. On the day before the announcement, the 
volatility of interest rates with 1-week and 1-month maturity is significantly lower when 
BI rate is cut or doesn’t change. On the day after the announcement, volatility of interest 
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rate is significantly lower for overnight and 1-month maturity if BI rate is cut; for 
overnight, 1-week, and 1-month maturity if BI rate doesn’t change; and for overnight 
maturity if BI rate is raised. Finally, day-of-the-week effect doesn’t have a significant 
effect on interest volatility.   
 
Table 6: Estimation Results for Interest Rate (with Direction of BI-Rate Change) 
 R_1N R_1W R_1M  R_1N R_1W R_1M 
Mean Equation   Variance Equation   
C 1.599*** 0.684*** 0.548*** C 2.898 0.861*** 0.375*** 
 (5.08) (3.46) (4.00)  (1.51) (4.50) (10.04) 
R_1N(-1) 0.786*** 0.921*** 0.950*** ARCH(1) 0.078 0.141 0.156 
 (21.06) (42.04) (102.52)  (1.15) (1.27) (0.25) 
DUM_NEG(-1) -1.148*** -0.640*** -0.181*** GARCH(1) 0.487 0.573*** 0.579*** 
 -(2.84) -(2.99) -(4.00)  (1.41) (8.88) (5.64) 
DUM_NEG -0.049 -0.152 0.020 DUM_NEG(-1) -2.251 -1.016*** -0.385*** 
 -(0.15) -(0.67) (0.80)  -(1.13) -(3.07) -(10.35) 
DUM_NEG(1) -0.002 0.408 -0.041 DUM_NEG -2.185 -0.756 -0.403*** 
 -(0.01) (0.95) -(0.43)  -(1.55) -(0.79) -(3.56) 
DUM_NOL(-1) 0.312 0.100 0.012 DUM_NEG(1) -3.778*** -0.196 -0.514*** 
 (0.64) (1.36) (0.17)  -(5.58) -(0.14) -(4.12) 
DUM_NOL -0.130 -0.185*** -0.012 DUM_NOL(-1) -1.485 -0.825*** -0.377*** 
 -(0.59) -(2.55) -(0.14)  -(0.90) -(4.44) -(10.06) 
DUM_NOL(1) -0.192 0.064 0.004 DUM_NOL -2.049 -0.638** -0.288* 
 -(0.52) (0.80) (0.06)  -(1.05) -(2.35) -(1.80) 
DUM_POS(-1) -0.830 -0.226 0.271 DUM_NOL(1) -2.789* -0.661*** -0.276*** 
 -(1.09) -(0.47) (0.21)  -(1.72) -(2.69) -(3.10) 
DUM_POS 0.904 0.019 0.412 DUM_POS(-1) 0.365 0.088 0.040 
 (1.16) (0.01) (0.20)  (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) 
DUM_POS(1) 0.518 0.638 0.292 DUM_POS 0.329 0.126 0.061 
 (0.79) (0.95) (0.38)  (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) 
TUE 0.458** 0.096 -0.055** DUM_POS(1) -5.539*** 0.105 0.036 
 (2.07) (1.46) -(2.11)  -(7.09) (0.15) (0.08) 
THU 0.105 -0.046 -0.085** TUE -1.001 -0.346 -0.149 
 (0.36) -(0.35) -(2.53)   -(0.85) -(1.10) -(1.01) 
    THU -0.106 -0.062 -0.081 
     -(0.07) -(0.12) -(0.66) 
R-squared 0.632 0.856 0.909    
Adjusted R-squared 0.615 0.849 0.905    
S.E. of regression 1.874 0.984 0.651    
Sum squared resid 1956.8 539.7 236.4    
Log likelihood -1187.2 -825.3 -457.0    
Durbin-Watson stat 1.902 1.939 1.778    
Notes:  Numbers in the parentheses are z-statistics with Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard 
error. ***) significant at 1%; **) significant at 5%; *) significant at 10%. 
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7.2. Exchange Rate Return, Stock Return and Government Bond’s Yield 
 The model without breaking down the announcement does not show significant 
effect on the announcement on either exchange rate return or stock return both in level 
and in volatility (Table 7). However, when we breakdown the announcement based on 
the direction of the BI rate, in some cases the effect of the announcement is significant 
(Table 8). A day before the announcement in which the BI rate does not change, 
exchange rate return is significantly higher, and on the day of the announcement and a 
day before the announcement of higher BI rate, stock return is significantly higher. But 
the stock return is significantly lower a day after the announcement of higher BI rate. For 
government bond’s yield, a day before the announcement of lower BI rate, the yield on 
government bond is significantly lower, but on the day that BI rate is announced higher, 
the yield on government bond is significantly higher.   
 
Table 7: Estimation Results for Exchange Rate Return, Stock Return  
  and Government Bond’s Yield (without Direction of BI Rate Change) 
 R_ER R_JSX SUN_1Y  R_ER R_JSX SUN_1Y 
Mean  
Equation   
 Variance 
Equation   
 
C -0.013 0.202*** 0.195 C 0.033* 0.108 0.157*** 
 -(0.56) (3.63) (0.91)  (1.74) (1.06) (7.42) 
R_1N(-1) -0.013 0.126** 0.980*** ARCH(1) 0.293*** 0.297*** 1.610 
 -(0.19) (2.39) (59.18)  (3.86) (3.60) (1.09) 
DUM(-1) 0.011 -0.197 0.042 GARCH(1) 0.666*** 0.608*** 0.034 
 (0.16) -(1.03) (1.25)  (10.58) (7.58) (0.50) 
DUM 0.007 -0.022 0.097 DUM(-1) -0.024 0.270 -0.127*** 
 (0.11) -(0.11) (1.47)  -(0.85) (1.06) -(5.82) 
DUM(1) 0.035 -0.113 0.056 DUM -0.063 -0.433 -0.087*** 
 (0.43) -(0.48) (1.12)  -(1.29) -(1.17) -(3.91) 
TUE -0.039 -0.067 0.006 DUM(1) 0.047 0.484 -0.118*** 
 -(0.94) -(0.54) (0.19)  (0.70) (0.90) -(7.12) 
THU -0.010 0.027 -0.019 TUE -0.017 0.369 -0.046*** 
 -(0.22) (0.24) -(0.23)  -(0.40) (1.55) -(3.55) 
    THU -0.044 0.060 0.025 
     -(1.12) (0.24) (0.47) 
        
R-squared  -0.002 0.000 0.944    
Adjusted R-squared  -0.027 -0.025 0.943    
S.E. of regression  0.563 1.353 0.493    
Sum squared resid  180.1 1040.1 138.2    
Log likelihood  -344.8 -920.5 -227.5    
Durbin-Watson stat  2.252 2.062 2.583    
Notes:  Numbers in the parentheses are z-statistics with Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard   
error. ***) significant at 1%; **) significant at 5%; *) significant at 10%. 
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Table 8: Estimation Results for Exchange Rate, Stock Returns  
   and Government Bond’s Yield (with Direction of BI-Rate Change) 
 R_ER R_JSX SUN_1Y  R_ER R_JSX SUN_1Y 
Mean  
Equation   
 Variance  
Equation   
 
        
C -0.031 0.121* 0.334 C 0.246*** 1.428*** 0.223*** 
 -(1.14) (1.77) (2.68)  (3.71) (4.95) (6.33) 
R_1N(-1) -0.046 0.104** 0.968*** ARCH(1) 0.160 0.142*** 0.123 
 -(0.87) (1.99) (90.32)  (1.55) (2.52) (1.61) 
DUM_NEG(-1) -0.001 -0.053 -0.240* GARCH(1) 0.531*** 0.505*** 0.567*** 
 -(0.01) -(0.23) -(1.88)  (3.23) (4.14) (8.26) 
DUM_NEG 0.007 0.057 0.016 DUM_NEG(-1) -0.198*** -1.040** -0.083 
 (0.15) (0.27) (0.35)  -(2.79) -(2.45) -(0.52) 
DUM_NEG(1) -0.046 -0.020 -0.089 DUM_NEG -0.223*** -0.985* -0.216*** 
 -(1.19) -(0.06) -(1.51)  -(2.64) -(1.94) -(2.07) 
DUM_NOL(-1) 0.105** -0.180 0.011 DUM_NEG(1) -0.194 -0.589 -0.385*** 
 (2.36) -(0.43) (0.29)  -(1.38) -(0.63) -(7.51) 
DUM_NOL -0.055 -0.344 -0.011 DUM_NOL(-1) -0.193*** -0.618 -0.228*** 
 -(0.38) -(0.91) -(0.28)  -(4.87) -(1.03) -(6.45) 
DUM_NOL(1) -0.114 -0.162 -0.238 DUM_NOL -0.119 -0.105 -0.222* 
 -(0.93) -(0.49) -(1.68)  -(1.54) -(0.28) -(1.81) 
DUM_POS(-1) -0.331 0.796** 0.096 DUM_NOL(1) -0.201** -1.088** -0.128 
 -(1.24) (2.02) (1.58)  -(2.39) -(2.22) -(1.24) 
DUM_POS 0.036 0.498*** 0.235*** DUM_POS(-1) -0.080 -0.844* -0.211*** 
 (0.17) (3.73) (3.03)  -(0.61) -(1.69) -(5.96) 
DUM_POS(1) 0.202 -0.760* 0.184 DUM_POS -0.096 -1.083*** -0.247** 
 (0.85) -(1.68) (1.33)  -(0.85) -(2.71) -(2.18) 
TUE 0.040 -0.048 0.025 DUM_POS(1) -0.249* -1.367** -0.350*** 
 (0.75) -(0.40) (0.77)  -(1.92) -(2.20) -(4.50) 
THU -0.008 0.047 -0.098*** TUE -0.134* -1.081*** -0.057 
 -(0.16) (0.37) -(2.13)  -(1.73) -(3.00) -(0.48) 
    THU -0.181*** -1.188*** -0.011 
     -(2.80) -(3.70) -(0.08) 
        
R-squared 0.016 0.011 0.945    
Adjusted R-squared -0.030 -0.035 0.943    
S.E. of regression 0.564 1.360 0.493    
Sum squared resid 176.9 1028.4 135.5    
Log likelihood -431.8 -954.6 -387.2    
Durbin-Watson stat 2.183 2.031 2.590    
Notes:  Numbers in the parentheses are z-statistics with Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard 
error. ***) significant at 1%; **) significant at 5%; *) significant at 10%. 
 
 
If we look at volatility, the volatility of exchange rate return is significantly lower 
on the day of the announcement and a day before the announcement of lower BI rate, on 
the day before the announcement of unchanged BI rate, and on the day following the 
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announcement of higher BI rate. The volatility of stock return is also lower on the day of 
announcement and a day before the announcement of lower BI rate, on the day following 
the announcement of unchanged BI rate, on the day of announcement, and before and 
following the announcement of higher BI rate. Lower volatility of stock return is 
consistent with Bomfim’s (2003) finding for US stock market. The volatility of 
government bond’s yield is also significantly lower on the day of the announcement 
regardless the direction of the BI rate change, on the day before the announcement that BI 
rate does not change or higher BI rate, and on the day after the announcement of lower or 
higher BI rate. On Tuesday and Thursday, the volatility of exchange rate return and stock 
return is significantly lower.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 Starting in July 2005, Bank Indonesia has used BI rate as a reference interest rate 
and since then the decision on BI rate has been announced publicly every month. In this 
paper we examine the effect of the BI rate announcements following the monetary policy 
meeting every month. The estimation results reveal a number of regularities. First, 
interbank interest rates with overnight, 1-week, and 1-month maturity are significantly 
lower a day before the announcement of lower BI-rate. On the other hand, exchange rate, 
stock return, or government bond’s yield are not significantly affected by BI-rate 
announcements.  
Second, the announcements of lower or stay BI-rate significantly bring down 
volatility of interbank interest rate with overnight, 1-week, and 1-month maturity, 
government-bond yield with 1-year maturity, as well as exchange rate and stock returns.   
 Third, in terms of level, the largest effect of BI-rate announcement takes place in 
overnight interbank interest rates while the lowest effect takes place in 1-month interbank 
interest rate. Similarly, in terms of volatility, the largest effect of BI-rate announcement 
takes place in overnight interbank while the lowest effect takes place in 1-month 
overnight interest rate.  
If we compare the effect of BI rate announcement on interbank interest rates and 
government bonds, it turns out that the effect of BI rate announcement on government 
bond is lower than that of overnight interest rates with overnight, 1-week, and 1-month 
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maturities. If we compare the magnitude of the effects of BI rate announcements on 
exchange rate return and stock return, the effect on stock return is much larger than the 
effect on exchange rate return.  
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